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In the past several decades the United States and other advanced countries 
have seen growth in direct employee participation in the ﬁ  nancial perfor-
mance of capitalist enterprises. This participation can take many forms, 
including proﬁ  t sharing, gain sharing, bonuses, employee stock ownership, 
and broad-  based stock options. All of these approaches have one thing in 
common: oﬀering the worker a share in proﬁ  ts or stock appreciation when 
the company makes a proﬁ  t. Our broad label for this participation is “shared 
capitalism.”
This growth is driven in part by evolution of the corporate form under 
capitalism, increased competitive pressures, environmental volatility, and 
rapid technological change, which have led ﬁ  rms to implement new forms 
of workplace organization and human resource practices. These changes 
include increased teamwork, employee participation in decisions, and 
other practices that can work in conjunction with ﬁ  nancial participation to 
increase worker productivity, skills, commitment, and job security. Shared 
capitalist institutions with new forms of high performance work organiza-
tion, not traditional labor- management relations, may be the emerging form 
of employee relations under capitalism.
This raises a number of important questions for ﬁ  rms, workers, and eco-
nomic policymakers:
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•   To what extent are these new modes of ﬁ  nancial participation and 
decision- making  related?
•    Are they likely to increase or decrease economic inequality?
•   Do they generally supplement or substitute for standard forms of com-
pensation?
•    How can they best improve productivity in ways that will beneﬁ  t both 
ﬁ  rms and ordinary workers?
•    Do employees welcome shared capitalism or are they uneasy about the 
increased ﬁ  nancial risk and responsibility that this places on them?
•    Are the new forms of participation likely to continue to grow?
Following a discussion of why shared capitalism exists at all, we sum-
marize data on the current forms and extent of shared capitalism in the US 
economy. We then provide an overall portrait of shared capitalism using 
the General Social Survey (GSS) and NBER data sets that will be used to 
answer the previous questions in the other chapters of this book, along with 
an initial exploration of how shared capitalism is related to job and com-
pany characteristics, work organization, risk aversion, and worker prefer-
ences.
1.1      Why Share with Workers?
Standard economic analysis outlines two key problems with shared capi-
talism plans that argue against their use. Principal-  agent analysis says that 
owners/ managers can improve employees’ performance by giving employees 
pay contingent on performance, but group incentives suﬀer from the free 
rider or “1/ N” problem due to the increasingly weak link between individual 
performance and rewards as the size of the group expands. Economic anal-
ysis therefore predicts that ﬁ  rms will favor tying ﬁ  nancial rewards to local 
economic performance and outcomes rather than to company-  wide out-
comes. This is because proﬁ  t sharing or gain sharing based on workplace 
outcomes can motivate workers in a small group, who can inﬂ  uence the 
costs and revenues of that group. Hence, the argument suggests that ﬁ  rms 
that introduce ﬁ  nancial sharing should eschew company- wide sharing, since 
there is virtually nothing the local group can do to aﬀect the share price of 
the ﬁ  rm.
A second key problem with shared capitalism plans is income variability 
for risk-  averse workers. Firms are predicted to select the least costly form 
of rewarding workers. In traditional analyses where ﬁ  rms are risk-  neutral 
and workers are risk-  averse, this means paying employees wages or salaries, 
rather than with variable pay dependent on company performance. Firms 
that oﬀer more risky modes of wage payment should have to compensate 
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Given these (and other1) problems, why are there any shared capitalism 
plans? The major reasons for adopting shared capitalism can be categorized 
as productivity-   or ﬂ  exibility-  related.
1.1.1      Productivity Reasons for Shared Capitalism Plans
Firms may ﬁ  nd that group incentives are better than individual incentives 
for encouraging productive teamwork and information sharing, especially 
where centralized supervision is costly. The free rider problem may be over-
come by creation of an implicit cooperative agreement among employees to 
work hard, enforced by monitoring co- worker performance and applying peer 
pressure where needed (Weitzman and Kruse 1990). What it takes to create 
and maintain such an agreement is unclear and may vary from workplace 
to workplace—it is likely that company human resource policies, employee 
relations, and general corporate culture play a large role. A growing body of 
literature ﬁ  nds that combinations of workplace policies may induce behav-
iors that improve performance (see, e.g., Ichniowski et al. [1996]; Becker, 
Huselid, and Ulrich [2001]). It has been demonstrated that globalization in 
speciﬁ  c industries and ﬁ  rms is linked to the adoption of high performance 
work practices (Blasi and Kruse 2006).
A productivity motivation for adopting and maintaining shared capital-
ism plans is directly expressed by many ﬁ  rms (US GAO 1986, 20; Kruse 
1993, 33), and is supported by several ﬁ  ndings in studies of adoption.2 Stud-
ies generally ﬁ  nd, however, that proﬁ  t-  sharing and employee ownership 
plans are more common in large ﬁ  rms, which runs counter to the idea that 
the free rider problem will favor greater productivity in small ﬁ  rms.3
1. While these are the two most common theoretical objections to shared capitalism plans, 
there are others as well. These include the possibility that diluting the economic surplus received 
by the owner will decrease performance by weakening the owner’s incentive to monitor work-
ers closely (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), and the objection that proﬁ  t sharing will decrease the 
ﬁ  rm’s incentives to make capital investments (Summers 1986). See Putterman and Skillman 
(1988) and Weitzman (1986) for responses to these, and Bonin and Putterman (1987) and Dow 
(2003) for additional theoretical arguments for and against shared capitalism plans.
2. Pendleton (2006) ﬁ  nds that employee discretion over methods and pace of work positively 
predicts the use of broad-  based employee ownership plans, and that such discretion also pre-
dicts using employee ownership and individual incentives in combination. Oyer and Schaefer 
(2005) ﬁ  nd that adoption of broad-  based stock option plans can be explained by retention 
and sorting, but not incentive eﬀects. Kruse (1996) ﬁ  nds that R&D levels are higher among old 
proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms, and job enrichment plans were more likely to be adopted just before new 
proﬁ  t-  sharing plans, suggesting complementarities aimed at improving productivity. Beatty 
(1994) ﬁ  nds that risk variables suggest a productivity motivation for adoption of ESOPs. Ich-
niowski and Shaw (1995) ﬁ  nd that group incentives are more likely to be adopted when they are 
part of a package of complementary policies to improve productivity, and also ﬁ  nd evidence 
of large switching costs that discourage ﬁ  rms with established technologies and workplace 
relationships from adopting new practices. Kim (2005) ﬁ  nds that reducing nonlabor costs and 
improving employee relations are predictors of adoption of gain-  sharing plans.
3. See Gregg and Machin (1988); Poole (1989); Fitzroy and Kraft (1995); Kruse (1996); and 
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Shared capitalism does appear to create productive cooperation, at least 
in some companies. Existing evidence from over sixty studies indicates a 
positive association on average between shared capitalism programs and 
company performance, but with substantial dispersion in results (Kruse and 
Blasi 1997; Kruse 2002). The average estimated increase in productivity as-
sociated with employee ownership and proﬁ  t sharing is about 4.5 percent, and 
is maintained when using pre/ post comparisons and attempts to control for 
selection bias. Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2001) ﬁ  nd positive eﬀects of 
group incentives, particularly when combined with problem-  solving teams. 
Other studies of gain sharing also ﬁ  nd positive results, particularly when 
there is high employee involvement in design and operation, shorter payout 
periods, controllable targets, and perceptions of procedural and distributive 
justice (Bullock and Tubbs 1990; Welbourne and Mejia 1995; Collins 1998). 
There may be a number of pathways through which shared capitalism has 
eﬀects on performance, and these pathways and complementarities may 
diﬀer among types of shared capitalism (Robinson and Wilson 2006). Many 
of the eﬀects of shared capitalism plans on performance are likely to work 
through employee attitudes and behaviors.4 Most studies ﬁ  nd that organiza-
tional commitment and identiﬁ  cation are higher under employee ownership, 
while giving mixed results between favorable and neutral on motivation and 
behavioral measures (Kruse and Blasi 1997). The results are consistent with 
opinion polls, which ﬁ  nd that most members of the public think that work-
ers in employee ownership ﬁ  rms work harder and better (reviewed in Kruse 
and Blasi [1999]).
1.1.2      Flexibility Reasons for Shared Capitalism Plans
Firms may also adopt shared capitalism plans for ﬂ  exibility-  related rea-
sons. These plans can provide something of value to workers without a 
ﬁ  xed obligation (such as a wage or salary increase) that the company may 
have diﬃculty meeting depending on future performance and the competi-
tive environment. A ﬂ  exibility motivation is supported by the ﬁ  nding that 
increased volatility in proﬁ  ts helps predict adoption of proﬁ  t-  sharing and 
employee ownership plans (Kruse 1996), although another study found that 
low- risk  ﬁ  rms are more likely to provide company stock matches in 401(k) 
plans (Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner 2004).
Some of the ﬁ  rm’s ﬁ  nancial risk is being shared with workers, which as 
noted before, may disadvantage risk-  averse workers unless they are com-
pensated for the risk. Consistent with the idea that workers are risk averse, 
most prefer straight wage salary to company-  wide or individual incentives; 
however, a majority express positive views toward employee ownership and 
proﬁ  t sharing, and would like at least part of their next raise to be in com-
pany stock (summarized in Kruse and Blasi [1999]). The extant evidence 
4. Bartel et al. (2003) ﬁ  nd that employee attitudes aﬀect a variety of workplace outcomes.Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy    4 5
indicates that workers generally do not sacriﬁ  ce pay and beneﬁ  ts for shared 
capitalism plans: wages and compensation tend to be higher on average for 
workers in employee ownership and proﬁ  t-  sharing plans (Blasi, Conte, and 
Kruse 1996; Kardas, Scharf, and Keogh 1998; Kruse 1993, 113–  14; Kruse 
1998; Scharf and Mackin 2000). In exchange for the ﬁ  nancial risk, work-
ers may beneﬁ  t through lower risk of displacement: prior studies ﬁ  nd that 
employee ownership ﬁ  rms tend to have more stable employment and higher 
survival rates than other ﬁ  rms (Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1993; Blair, Kruse, 
and Blasi 2000; Park, Kruse, and Sesil 2004). The prediction by Weitzman 
(1984) that proﬁ  t sharing should stabilize ﬁ  rm employment has also received 
support in many, though not all, studies.5
1.1.3      Other Reasons for Shared Capitalism Plans
There are several reasons that ﬁ  rms may adopt shared capitalism plans 
apart from those that are productivity-   or ﬂ  exibility-  related. First, ﬁ  rms 
may adopt such plans due to tax and regulatory incentives—for example, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) enjoyed substantial tax incen-
tives in the 1980s, and retiring owners can still avoid capital gains taxes if 
they sell their stock to an ESOP. Second, some employee ownership plans 
were adopted in the 1980s in response to hostile takeover threats (Blasi and 
Kruse 1991). Both takeover threats and tax incentives were clearly a factor 
in some 1980s ESOP adoptions (Blasi and Kruse 1991; Beatty 1994). Third, 
ﬁ  rms may adopt employee ownership or proﬁ  t sharing out of a desire to 
discourage unionization by increasing employee identiﬁ  cation with the com-
pany. Proﬁ  t- sharing plans are less common among unionized workers, which 
at least partly reﬂ  ects ﬁ  rms dropping such plans after a union drive (Freeman 
and Kleiner 1990; Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990; Kruse 1996). Findings 
are mixed on the relation between unionization and employee ownership.6
Finally, shared capitalism plans may be adopted and promoted for moral 
or social reasons. Albert Gallatin, a signer of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and Secretary of the Treasury under Thomas Jeﬀerson, set up a proﬁ  t-
  sharing plan at the Pennsylvania Glass Works in 1795, stating that the 
“democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should not be 
restricted to the political processes but should be applied to the industrial 
operation” (quoted in US Senate [1939, 72]). Workers who started the ﬁ  rst 
unions in colonial American coastal cities set up some worker cooperatives 
5. Studies of Weitzman’s prediction that proﬁ  t sharing should stabilize ﬁ  rm employment 
have produced mixed ﬁ  ndings: a majority support the proposition that ﬁ  rms view proﬁ  t shar-
ing diﬀerently from ﬁ  xed wages in making employment decisions, while half of the studies 
ﬁ  nd greater employment stability associated with proﬁ  t sharing and the other half ﬁ  nd either 
no greater stability or greater stability only in some samples (summarized in Kruse [1998, 
109– 13]).
6. Gregg and Machin (1988) and Poole (1989) ﬁ  nd employee ownership is more common in 
unionized companies in the United Kingdom, while Kruse (1996) ﬁ  nds that ESOP adoption 
was equally likely in union and nonunion establishments in the 1970s and 1980s.46        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
as alternatives to the craft ﬁ  rms where some master craftsmen were attempt-
ing to introduce more division of labor in order to deskill traditional craft 
workers and reduce their pay. A century later, some labor organizations set 
up worker cooperatives as part of a political challenge to how capitalism 
was developing, while others saw employee ownership and proﬁ  t sharing as 
a means to build support for capitalism in opposition to the competing com-
munist and socialist systems—arguing that it would help cure “unrest” and 
“irrational agitation” in capitalism, and that the “great uplift and inspiration 
that sharing of proﬁ  ts cultivates in the employee” would lead to “harmony 
and contentment” (Askwith 1926, 20). John D. Rockefeller and other corpo-
rate leaders in 1919 encouraged employee ownership, employee involvement 
in corporate decision- making, and proﬁ  t sharing as part of a grand plan for 
“welfare capitalism” that spread in the 1920s. Proﬁ  t sharing was promoted 
in the 1930s in Congressional hearings in the 1930s by Republican Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg, and ESOPs were promoted by investment banker Louis 
Kelso in conjunction with Democratic Senator Russell Long of Louisiana in 
the 1970s, as ways to broaden participation in the economic system.7
In sum, the two key objections to group incentives—the free rider problem 
and worker risk aversion—have not been suﬃcient to quash shared capital-
ism plans. They continue to be adopted and maintained, providing a fertile 
ground for examining outcomes for both ﬁ  rms and workers. As will be seen, 
such programs now involve almost half of adult workers in the economy, 
albeit at diﬀerent levels of intensity and with diﬀerent combinations of work 
practices. The next section reviews current data on the prevalence of shared 
capitalism plans, followed by a more intensive look at the kind of company 
policies associated with shared capitalism that can shed light on how they 
are used by companies.
1.2      Prevalence of Shared Capitalism Programs
There are a variety of forms that shared capitalism programs can take, 
which we break into four broad categories: proﬁ  t sharing, gainsharing, 
employee ownership, and stock options. The NBER Shared Capitalism 
program sponsored several questions on shared capitalism in the 2002 and 
2006 General Social Surveys and the 2003 National Organizations Survey, 
providing the most recent representative data available. The results from 
these surveys are summarized in table 1.1, while Appendix table 1A.1 sum-
marizes other nationally representative surveys and administrative data over 
the past ﬁ  fteen years. All of the surveys have high response rates. Four of 
the surveys were conducted by the US Census Bureau (the two National 
Employer Surveys, the National Compensation Survey, and the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth), two surveys were conducted by the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago (General 
7. For a more extensive history of shared capitalism see Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein (2003).Table 1.1  Current prevalence of shared capitalism plans
    (1)   (2)   (3)
Source GSS GSS NOS
Year 2002 2006 2002
Type of data Employee survey Employee survey Firm survey
Proﬁ  t sharing
    Percent of employees covered
          Eligible for bonuses based on company 
 performance
34 38 46
          Received bonus last year based on 
 company  performance
24 30
  Percent  of  ﬁ  rms with plans
          Any employees eligible for bonuses based 
  on company performance
62
Gain sharing
    Percent of employees covered
          Eligible for bonuses based on department 
  or team performance
23 27 23
          Received bonus last year based on 
  department or team performance
17 21
  Percent  of  ﬁ  rms with plans
          Any employees eligible for bonuses based 
  on department or team performance
35
Employee ownership
    Percent of employees covered
    Own  company  stock 21 18 16
  Percent  of  ﬁ  rms
    Any  employees  own  company  stock 33
Stock options
    Percent of employees covered
    Hold  stock  options 13  9
    Granted  stock  options  last  year  5
  Percent  of  ﬁ  rms




  Any  of  above 43 47
  Just  one  form:
      Rec’d  proﬁ  t-   or gain-  sharing bonus last 
 year
14.6 21.2
    Hold  company  stock 5.0 3.8
    Hold  stock  options 0.7 0.7
  Two  forms:
          Hold co. stock and rec’d proﬁ  t-   or gain- 
  sharing bonus last year
3.7 5.3
        Hold co. stock and stock options 6.1 3.2
          Hold stock options and rec’d proﬁ  t-   or 
  gain-  sharing bonus last year
0.4 0.6
  All  three  forms 6.1 4.6
Sample size   1,257   1,173   312
Notes: GSS  General Social Survey; NOS  National Organizations Survey.48        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
Social Survey and National Organizations Survey), and two were conducted 
by professional survey organizations (the Worker Representation and Partici-
pation Survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates, and the Employee 
Beneﬁ  ts Research Institute survey by Gallup). All surveys are based on the 
full private sector, except the National Employer Surveys, which are limited 
to private for-  proﬁ  t ﬁ  rms.8
1.2.1    Proﬁ  t Sharing Prevalence
There is no hard and fast deﬁ  nition of proﬁ  t sharing. Many ﬁ  rms have for-
mal plans that are called proﬁ  t sharing, but there is variation in (a) how prof-
its are deﬁ  ned, (b) whether proﬁ  ts must meet a threshold level, (c) whether 
some or all of the proﬁ  t share is discretionary, and (d) whether the proﬁ  t 
share is paid in cash or is deferred (put into a deﬁ  ned contribution pension 
plan). In addition, ﬁ  rms may have bonus plans that are not called proﬁ  t shar-
ing, but that eﬀectively share proﬁ  ts since the bonus is aﬀected by how well 
the company is doing. As shown in table 1.1, just over one-  third of employ-
ees say that they are covered by proﬁ  t sharing in 2002 (34 percent) and 2006 
(38 percent), which is in line with earlier employee surveys in table 1A.1. 
Employers reported a higher percentage of employees eligible for bonuses 
based on company performance (46 percent), though another survey using 
a more restricted deﬁ  nition showed lower ﬁ  gures (30 percent of workers are 
in a deferred proﬁ  t-  sharing plan while 5 percent are in a cash proﬁ  t-  sharing 
plan, in table 1A.1).
1.2.2    Gain  Sharing  Prevalence
Gain- sharing plans typically tie employee compensation to a group- based 
operational measure—such as physical output, productivity, quality, safety, 
customer satisfaction, or costs—rather than to a company-  wide ﬁ  nancial 
measure such as proﬁ  tability or returns. These plans often involve employees 
in some formal way to develop ideas and skills for improving performance. 
The three most popular types are Scanlon, Rucker, and ImproShare plans, 
although there is a growing number of custom-  designed plans. As shown 
in table 1.1, employee and company surveys agree that about one-  fourth 
(23 to 27 percent) of employees are eligible for bonuses based on group or 
workplace performance.9
8. The full private sector ﬁ  gures include nonproﬁ  t organizations. While these organizations 
cannot have employee ownership and stock options, they can have organization-   and group-
 based bonuses that are equivalent to proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing, so their inclusion provides 
the best estimates of the extent to which shared capitalism has permeated the entire private 
sector. Other chapters in this volume restrict attention to for-  proﬁ  t ﬁ  rms.
9. About two- ﬁ  fths (43 percent) of Fortune 1000 surveyed companies have gain- sharing plans 
somewhere in the company, although most include less than 20 percent of employees (Lawler, 
Mohrman, and Ledford 1995, 19). Broader surveys of compensation and human resource 
managers have found that only about one-  eighth (13 percent) have formal gain sharing plans 
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1.2.3    Employee  Ownership  Prevalence
Employee ownership of company stock can occur in a variety of ways. 
Combining all the ways, the GSS surveys in table 1.1 show that roughly one-
 ﬁ fth of employees report owning some company stock (21 percent in 2002 
and 18 percent in 2006, which is in line with earlier surveys in table 1A.1). 
The most popular type of plan is the ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan). The ESOP is distinguished by the fact that workers do not have to 
use their own money to buy the stock (unless stock was traded for wage 
and work rule changes, which happens only in a very small minority of 
ESOPs). Federal legislation allows companies to borrow money from a 
bank to fund the worker stock and pay for it in installments from company 
revenues. About 5 percent of employees are part of ESOPs (table 1A.1). 
Employees may also own company stock through other types of deﬁ  ned 
contribution plans. Many employees have bought stock through their com-
pany 401(k) plan, a retirement plan where they make pretax contributions 
from their paycheck. Sometimes corporations will match employee contri-
butions to 401(k) plans with company stock, so this one limited aspect of 
401(k)-  based employee ownership is closer to the ESOP because workers 
do not buy it. About 20 percent of workers are eligible for a deﬁ  ned con-
tribution plan that holds employer stock (table 1A.1). These non-  ESOP 
pension plans also include various Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)-  covered stock bonus plans and deferred proﬁ  t-  sharing trusts 
(often combined with 401(k) plans), which actually hold some of their assets 
in company stock.
Employees can also own company stock outside of pension plans. Em-
ployee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) allow workers to buy stock with 
deductions from their paycheck with a discount from the market price, and 
some corporations provide employees direct grants of stock as part of a 
stock bonus plan. Employees may also hold onto stock after exercising stock 
options, or own stock through open market purchases. These plans combine 
with the pension plans to make about one-  ﬁ  fth of private sector employees 
into employee-  owners.
1.2.4    Stock  Options  Prevalence
Stock options represent a kind of hybrid between proﬁ  t sharing and 
employee ownership. A stock option is the right to buy the stock at a set 
price for ten years into the future. The worker does not have to purchase the 
stock. Receiving one hundred stock options to purchase Biotech Inc. stock 
at $10 per share gives the worker the right to exercise these options anytime 
over ten years if the stock price goes above $10 per share. During the ten 
years, the worker can, for example, buy a stock trading at $15 a share for 
$10 per share, then sell the stock, and pocket the $5 proﬁ  t after taxes. While 
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managers and workers, a stock option has less risk than using one’s savings 
to buy the stock and really involves the right to the upside gain without the 
risk of losing one’s capital. The GSS surveys show a decline in stock option 
holding from 13 percent in 2002 to 9 percent in 2006, which we believe is due 
to the Security and Exchange Commission’s implementation of stock option 
expensing that led some companies to cut back on broad- based plans.10 Only 
14 percent of companies reported making stock option grants in 2002 and 
5 percent of employees in the 2006 GSS reported actually receiving a stock 
option grant in the prior year (table 1.1), while other surveys showed that 8 
percent of employees are eligible to receive stock options (table 1A.1).11
1.2.5      Overall Prevalence and Overlap Among 
Types of Shared Capitalism
The prevalence of any type of shared capitalism is high: the GSS surveys 
showed that 43 percent of employees reported participating in one or more 
of the above plans in 2002, rising to 47 percent in 2006 (table 1.1). The rise 
in proﬁ  t-  sharing and gain-  sharing eligibility more than oﬀset the declines 
in employee ownership and stock option holding between these two years. 
Earlier surveys show that between 41 percent and 75 percent of ﬁ  rms have 
shared capitalism plans (table 1A.1).
What is the overlap among the diﬀerent types of shared capitalism? This 
issue has never been comprehensively explored until the 2002 and 2006 
General Social Surveys. As shown in table 1.1, close to 15 percent of employ-
ees in the 2002 survey received a proﬁ  t-   or gain-  sharing bonus in the prior 
year but do not own company stock or hold stock options, rising to 21 per-
cent in 2006. There were 4 to 5 percent who just own company stock and less 
than 1 percent who just hold stock options. About 10 percent had two of the 
three forms of shared capitalism in both years, while 5 to 6 percent had all 
three. The important point here is that employee ownership and stock option 
holding are uncommon on their own, and typically paired with another type 
of shared capitalism. Over three-  fourths of the employee-  owners also have 
proﬁ  t- gain- sharing bonuses and/ or stock options, while almost all of the 13 
percent who hold stock options also have proﬁ   t- gain- sharing bonuses and/ or 
employee ownership. This high overlap suggests that ﬁ  rms may believe that 
it is worthwhile to develop employee ownership and stock options in com-
bination with each other and proﬁ  t/  gain sharing by placing together forms 
of shared capitalism that are less risky for workers (cash proﬁ  t sharing or 
stock options) with those that are more risky for workers (owning company 
10. This drop in stock option holding likely accounts for the drop in the percent of workers 
in the computer services industry who own company stock (from 58.3 percent to 31.9 percent). 
Because employee ownership often comes about as a result of being granted stock options, this 
drop is likely an unintended consequence of the employee stock option expensing.
11. The ﬁ  gure stayed at 8 percent in the 2006 survey (BLS 2006). The 2006 numbers are 
not presented in the table since there are no ﬁ  gures on deferred proﬁ  t sharing or employee 
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stock). Such combinations also reﬂ  ect a pairing of short- term and long- term 
incentives.
Employee ownership and proﬁ  t sharing have also received substantial 
attention in other advanced countries and transition economies. With cov-
erage similar to that in the United States, between 20 and 30 percent of 
workers in France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan are covered by some form 
of proﬁ  t sharing, while smaller numbers are covered by employee stock 
ownership (Del Boca, Kruse, and Pendleton 1999; Jones and Kato 1995). 
Across the European Union, between 5 and 43 percent of ﬁ  rms within each 
country have proﬁ  t-  sharing plans, between 1 and 22 percent have employee 
share ownership, and between 5 and 38 percent have team-  based bonuses 
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Con-
ditions 1997; Poutsma 1999; Pendleton et al. 2003; Poutsma, Kalmi, and 
Pendleton 2006). Some employee ownership is also found in Korea and 
Taiwan (Cin, Han, and Smith 2003, Kato et al. 2005) and in some socialist 
countries transiting to private ownership, including China (Tseo 1996; Chiu 
et al. 2005), Russia (Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997), and the countries in 
central and eastern Europe (Uvalic and Vaughan-  Whitehead 1997; Smith, 
Cin, and Vodopivec 1997). Broad-  based stock options have appeared in 
stock market companies and high tech ﬁ  rms in Asia and are newly emergent 
in China and India.
1.2.6      Employee Participation in Decision Making
Employee participation in decision making is often seen as complemen-
tary to ﬁ  nancial participation, most basically because ﬁ  nancial participation 
provides the incentive to improve performance while participation in deci-
sion making can provide a means to improve performance. Before looking at 
their overlap in the next section, table 1.2 summarizes the most recent survey 
data on the overall prevalence of employee participation in decisions. There 
is a lot of variation in the types and measures of employee participation. 
About two- ﬁ  fths of employees report having a lot of inﬂ  uence in decisions or 
say they often participate with others in job decisions in both 2002 and 2006, 
while one- third of employees report being in an employee involvement team 
(30 percent) or self-  managed work team (33 percent). Firms report a lower 
number of employees in these plans (17 percent each), while about two- ﬁ  fths 
of ﬁ  rms report having these plans at all. Data from earlier surveys in table 
1A.2 show great dispersion using diﬀerent measures, from a low of 13 to 16 
percent of employees in self-  managed teams to a high of 52 to 55 percent 
of employees in work-  related meetings for nonmanagers.
1.3      Looking Inside the Shared Capitalism Firms
The NBER project was established to take a closer look at shared capi-
talism plans, providing a more complete portrait along with an analysis of 
their causes and eﬀects. We complement the broad representative data from 52        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
the 2002 and 2006 GSS with an intensive analysis of employee survey data 
from fourteen companies that have a variety of shared capitalism programs, 
which we refer to as the NBER data set. Both data sets are described in the 
“Studying Shared Capitalism” section of the introduction to this volume.
We ﬁ rst focus on the size of the ﬁ  nancial stakes in shared capitalism, then 
examine the types of jobs covered and the types of companies that partici-
pate, then assess the relationship to work organization and company poli-
cies, and ﬁ  nally describe the risk proﬁ  le of participants and nonparticipants 
using new measures of risk aversion in the NBER data set.
1.3.1      Size of Financial Stakes in Shared Capitalism
The extent and characteristics of shared capitalism programs in the GSS 
and NBER data sets are presented in table 1.3. This table combines the 2002 
and 2006 GSS prevalence ﬁ  gures from table 1.1 (showing about one-  third 
of workers covered by proﬁ  t sharing, one-  fourth covered by gain sharing, 
one- ﬁ  fth holding company stock, and one- ninth holding stock options), and 
adds detail on the ﬁ  nancial stakes involved. The monetary value appears to 
be signiﬁ  cant for covered employees. The median proﬁ  t-  sharing and gain-
  sharing bonus in the GSS is $1,500, or 4.6 percent of annual pay, and their 
entire employer stock estate value totals $10,000 or 23 percent of annual pay 
for the median employee-  owner.
Table 1.2  Current prevalence of employee participation in decisions
    (1)   (2)   (3)
Source GSS GSS NOS
Year 2002 2006 2002
Type of data Employee survey Employee survey Firm survey
Percentage of employees covered
  Employee  involvement  team
  Self-managed  team 30 17
      Quality circles or employee involvement 
 committees
33 17
      Often participate with others in making 
  decisions that aﬀect job
42 38
      Often participate with others in helping 
  set how things are done on job
45 42
Percentage of ﬁ  rms with plans
    Self-  managed teams for nonmanagers 39
      Quality circles or employee involvement 
 committees
42
  Worker  safety  committees 49
Sample size   1,257   1,173   312
Notes: GSS  General Social Survey (from National Opinion Research Center, analyzed by authors) (all 
private sector); NOS  National Organizations Survey (from National Opinion Research Center, ana-
lyzed by authors) (all private sector).Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy    5 3
The column labeled “NBER company data set” naturally gives higher 
ﬁ  gures for the shared capitalist modes of compensation since we selected 
these ﬁ  rms on the basis of having these programs. Of the workers in the 
ﬁ  rms, 71 percent report being paid by proﬁ  t sharing, 21 percent report gain 
sharing, 64 percent report owning employer stock, and 22 percent report 
holding stock options. Overall, 86 percent of surveyed workers report having 






    2002–2006   data set   GSS   NBER
Bonus eligibility
  Proﬁ  t sharing 35.9% 71.3% 2,386 41,018
  Gain  sharing 24.9% 20.7% 2,386 41,023
    Size of most recent bonus, if eligible for any
    Mean  dollar  value $6,265 $11,329 693 26,113
    Median  dollar  value $1,500 $2,000 693 26,113
    Mean  %  of  pay  8.9% 12.1% 645 22,019
    Median  %  of  pay  4.6%  5.7% 645 22,019
Employee ownership
    Own employer stock in any form 19.4% 64.0% 2,406 41,206
    Own employer stock through:
    Employee  Stock  Ownership  Plan  8.1% 41,109
    Employee  Stock  Purchase  Plan 17.6% 40,990
    401(k)  plan 33.5% 40,885
    Exercising  options  and  keeping  stock  5.0% 41,032
    Open  market  purchase  7.3% 41,145
    Value of employer stock, if own stock
    Dollar  value:  Mean $63,130 $60,078 318 25,447
    Dollar  value:  Median $10,000 $14,375 318 25,447
    %  of  pay:  Mean 81.7% 65.0% 302 22,715
    %  of  pay:  Median 23.0% 30.6% 302 22,715
    %  of  wealth:  Mean 19.6% 23,141
    %  of  wealth:  Median 10.0% 23,141
Stock options
    Currently hold stock options 11.3% 21.9% 2,392 41,166
    Ever granted stock options 22.3% 41,166
    Granted stock options last year 20.4% 41,158
    Value of stock options, if hold options:
        Mean dollar value of unvested options $112,882 8,390
        Mean dollar value of vested options $143,117 8,497
    Total  dollar  value:  Mean $249,901 8,656
    Total  dollar  value:  Median $75,000 8,656
    %  of  pay:  Mean 183.7% 8,403
    %  of  pay:  Median 100.0% 8,403
    %  of  wealth:  Mean 60.3% 8,104
    %  of  wealth:  Median 28.6% 8,104
Any of above programs   44.9%   85.7%   2,430   41,20654        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
at least one of these programs. The size of the median proﬁ  t-  sharing and 
gain-  sharing stake are only somewhat higher among the NBER compa-
nies than in the GSS (5.7 percent compared to 4.6 percent), as is employee 
ownership as a percent of pay (30.6 percent compared to 23.0 percent). The 
median stock option holding is $75,000 (counting the estimated proﬁ  t on 
both vested and unvested stock options if they were exercised on the day of 
the survey), representing 100 percent of annual pay and 29 percent of total 
wealth. These stakes should be large enough to detect eﬀects on worker and 
ﬁ  rm outcomes, if such eﬀects exist.
1.3.2      Participation by Type of Job and Company
Where are shared capitalism plans most likely? Theory broadly suggests 
that they are most likely to be adopted in jobs and companies where perfor-
mance is most sensitive to employee eﬀort, or where the need for ﬂ  exibility 
is greatest. Table 1.4 provides participation rates by basic job and company 
characteristics, using both the representative GSS data set and our larger 
NBER data set, with more extensive measures.
The idea that shared capitalism is most likely in performance-  sensitive 
jobs is supported by the ﬁ  nding that proﬁ  t/  gain sharing is most common 
among sales and management employees (48 percent and 56 percent, in 
column [1]), but the incidence remains substantial among all but service 
employees (19 percent). Managers are also the most likely to own company 
stock (27 percent, column [2]), but are not particularly more likely to hold 
stock options (14 percent, column [3]). The NBER data show high levels of 
participation in proﬁ  t/  gain sharing and employee ownership for all occu-
pational groups, and low levels of stock options only among production 
workers and service employees (since the NBER stock option companies 
had few production or service employees, although this is not true for all 
stock option ﬁ  rms in the United States).
Those who have been at their jobs for less than one year are the least 
likely to participate in shared capitalism, partly reﬂ  ecting probationary peri-
ods (e.g., employees only become eligible for an ESOP after six months or 
one year). The exception is that new employees are more likely than older 
employees to hold stock options in the NBER data set, probably reﬂ  ecting 
the use of stock options to lure workers into the jobs.
Not surprisingly, shared capitalism is more common among full-  time 
employees in both the GSS and NBER data—such employees are more 
likely to be core employees whose commitment and eﬀort are important to 
workplace performance. Also not surprisingly, union members are less likely 
than nonunion employees to be part of proﬁ   t- gain- sharing plans (38 percent 
versus 14 percent, in column [1]). Unions tend to resist proﬁ  t sharing due to 
concerns that management can manipulate proﬁ  t ﬁ  gures, and that such pay 
can create inequality among workers (Zalusky 1990). Given the resistance 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy    5 7
members in the GSS are actually slightly more likely than nonunion employ-
ees to report owning company stock and holding stock options. While there 
have been some noteworthy examples of unions leading employee buyouts 
(which make up a very small percentage of ﬁ  rms with employee ownership), 
this employee ownership result more likely reﬂ  ects the greater likelihood of 
retirement plans among union employees, many of which invest in company 
stock.
The free rider problem predicts that these plans will be most advantageous 
in small workplaces, and some evidence in chapter 2 indicates that this is 
true. But while this would lead one to expect a greater prevalence of shared 
capitalism plans in small establishments, their prevalence is actually higher 
among larger establishments (columns [1] through [3]). All three types of 
shared capitalism are most common in establishments with 1,000 or more 
employees. This may be explained by the existence of ﬁ  xed costs in setting 
up plans, which can be spread across a larger number of employees in larger 
establishments. These large establishment sizes strongly suggest that if these 
companies want to use shared capitalism to enhance performance, they need 
to take steps to counter the free rider problem.
Finally, shared capitalism is well-  represented in every broad industry. 
Proﬁ  t/ gain sharing is most common in manufacturing, ﬁ  nance, and computer 
services ( 50 percent in each), while employee ownership and stock options 
are most common in transportation/  communications/  utilities, ﬁ  nance, and 
computer services. The ﬁ  gures are consistently highest in computer services, 
reﬂ  ecting the strong use of these incentives in new economy companies that 
rely heavily on human skill and ingenuity (Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003). 
The growth of high performance work practices and self-managed work 
teams in manufacturing also suggests that reliance on human skill and inge-
nuity is now more widely relevant in traditionally blue- collar industries. This 
is not consistent with the notion that shared rewards (especially employee 
ownership) will only work with professional groups such as lawyers or more 
specialized service ﬁ  rms (Hansmann 1996). Shared capitalism appears to be 
least prevalent in the agriculture/  mining/  construction industry group, yet 
this requires closer examination. Proﬁ  t sharing is quite common in these 
industries, and it has been reported that many large construction ﬁ  rms use 
shared capitalism practices. An analysis of incidence in the three separate 
industries making up this grouping is probably required.12
1.3.3      Work Organization and Shared Capitalism
How are these jobs structured, and what policies accompany shared capi-
talism plans? Table 1.5 uses the GSS and NBER data to explore how shared 
capitalism relates to several aspects of work organization and   policies, 
12. The newsletters of the National Center for Employee Ownership have reported on the con-
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  shedding some light on the role these plans may play in companies. The 
ﬁ  gures in table 1.5 are simple cross- tabulations—these relationships are ana-
lyzed using probit regressions in table 1.6.
Consistent with the idea that shared capitalism can encourage coopera-
tive teamwork, proﬁ  t/  gain sharing employees are more likely to work in 
teams, to be able to observe co-  worker performance, and to have low levels 
of supervision (columns [2] and [6]). The patterns are mixed, however, for 
employee-  owners and stock option holders. The stock option holders are 
more likely to work in teams and to have low levels of supervision, but are 
no more likely (and may be less likely) to easily observe co-  worker perfor-
mance (columns [4] and [8]). This may have to do with their concentration 
in high tech and computer industry ﬁ  rms. Employee-  owners are not more 
likely to work in teams or to ﬁ  nd it easy to observe co- workers, although they 
are more likely to have low levels of supervision (columns [3] and [7]). This 
suggests that proﬁ  t/  gain sharing may be the primary method for encourag-
ing cooperative teamwork in day-  to-  day work, while employee ownership 
and stock options may aﬀect other outcomes (e.g., identiﬁ  cation, loyalty, 
turnover). This is a good example of how we can learn from the analysis 
of prevalence. It could possibly be the basis of an argument for combining 
short-  term forms of shared capitalism like proﬁ  t/  gain sharing with longer 
horizon forms such as employee ownership and stock options. Whether 
these forms do have the eﬀects suggested by the prevalence ﬁ  gures is the job 
of other chapters to sort out.
Participation in decisions may, as discussed earlier, be an important com-
plement to shared capitalism programs in aﬀecting workplace performance. 
Such participation can give employees the means to improve performance, 
while shared capitalism provides the incentives. The data in table 1.5 gener-
ally support the idea of complementarity, with shared capitalism employees 
having higher levels on both the objective measure of participation (being 
in an employee involvement team) and the subjective measures (having 
say/ inﬂ  uence in one’s job, or participating with others in decisions aﬀecting 
one’s job). Proﬁ  t/  gain sharing is consistently linked to higher participation 
in both data sets, while employee ownership and stock option holding show 
mixed results in the GSS but strong associations with participation in the 
NBER data.13
Training may be another important complementary policy, helping to 
develop worker skills and commitment that can be reinforced by shared 
capitalism. The GSS tabulations in table 1.5 show that those with proﬁ  t/  gain 
sharing are more likely to report that they have the training opportuni-
ties they need. The shared capitalism employees in the NBER ﬁ  rms are 
more likely to have had employer-  sponsored training in the past year, while 
13. Kalmi, Pendleton, and Poutsma (2004) ﬁ  nd that the diﬀerent plan types have diﬀerent 
relationships to participatory practices.60        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
proﬁ  t/ gain sharing employees and employee- owners—but not stock option 
holders—are slightly more likely to frequently participate in job rotation.
Finally, job security may be an important complementary policy—it is 
hard to maintain worker commitment and cooperative teamwork if employ-
ees are afraid they will be laid oﬀ. Just over 90 percent of the GSS shared 
capitalism employees report they are unlikely to be laid oﬀ, which is higher 
than the 88 percent ﬁ  gure for the entire sample, with signiﬁ  cantly greater 
job security for proﬁ  t/  gain sharers and employee-  owners. All three groups 
of shared capitalism employees report signiﬁ  cantly greater job security in 
the NBER data. In addition, each of these three groups reports a higher 
expected likelihood of working at the company for a long time, and of seeing 
their current jobs as part of a long-  term career.
Table 1.6 analyzes these relationships using probit regressions to predict 
the likelihood of participating in each of the types of shared capitalism. The 
NBER regressions control for company ﬁ  xed eﬀects, thereby doing within-
 company comparisons of who participates. Most of the simple relationships 
described previously are maintained when controlling for other variables. 
In particular, each of the plans is associated with greater participation in 
decisions and with employer-  sponsored training in the past year. The ease 
of observing co-  workers is a signiﬁ  cant predictor of proﬁ  t/  gain sharing in 
both the GSS and NBER data, suggesting an important role for peer pres-
sure. Closeness of supervision is a strong negative predictor in the NBER 
sample, and high job security is a strong positive predictor, indicating that 
freedom from supervision and job security may be complementary policies. 
Finally, the GSS regressions conﬁ  rm that each type of shared capitalism is 
more likely in larger establishments (though the highest prevalence of proﬁ  t/
  gain sharing is among establishments with 100 to 999 employees rather 
than the 1,000 group).
1.3.4      Risk Aversion and Shared Capitalism
Risk aversion is clearly an important consideration in shared capitalism. 
We measured risk aversion with several questions on the NBER company 
surveys, including a self-  rating on a 0 to 10 scale, how much one would pay 
for a bet, whether one would take a job with stable pay versus one with risky 
but higher pay, and whether one regularly buys and sells stock on the stock 
market. These are strongly related and appear to measure a common risk 
propensity. Here we focus on the employee’s self-  rating, where 0 is “hate to 
take any kind of risk” and 10 is “love to take risks” (see question wording 
in Appendix A). The average score is 5.6, but there is wide dispersion: 20 
percent of employees give scores of 3 or less, and 41 percent give themselves 
scores of 7 or more. Of course these employees are not representative of the 
overall workforce, since they have chosen to work in companies with shared 
capitalism and 85 percent are covered by some type of shared capitalism 
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by examining its relation to plan participation and worker views of vari-
able pay.
Risk aversion is related to plan participation, as shown in table 1.7, but not 
always in expected ways. A surprising ﬁ  nding is that those who are eligible for 
proﬁ  t sharing rate themselves as more risk averse (less risk loving) than those 
who are not eligible, both before and after controlling for demographic, pay, 
and wealth variables (columns [3] and [5]). One explanation of this is that 
proﬁ  t sharing may be less risky than sinking your savings in your company 
stock under certain circumstances, such as where you feel you are paid at the 
market rate for wages and there is no wage substitution. Eligibility for gain 
sharing and individual bonuses, in contrast, is associated with greater risk 
loving. Like proﬁ  t sharers, stock option holders appear slightly more risk 
averse after controlling for demographic, pay, and wealth variables.
Employee owners appear to like risk more on average, but this varies by 
type of employee ownership. Those owning stock through 401(k) plans or 
open market purchases are clearly more risk loving than others (table 1.7, 
column [6]), undoubtedly reﬂ  ecting the self-  selection of risk lovers buying 
stock or allocating 401(k) accounts toward company stock. The ESOP mem-
Table 1.7  Risk aversion and participation in variable pay
   
Risk-  loving mean values 
(0–10 scale)
 
Risk loving as predictor 

















Proﬁ  t-  sharing eligibility 5.57 5.73 –0.16 (0.03)∗∗∗ –0.009 (0.001)∗∗∗
Gain- sharing  eligibility 6.02 5.51 0.51 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗
Individual bonus eligibility 6.01 5.46 0.55 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.003 (0.001)∗∗∗
Hold stock options 6.12 5.47 0.65 (0.03)∗∗∗ –0.001 (0.001)∗
Own co. stock 5.71 5.45 0.26 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.003 (0.001)∗∗
Own employer stock through:
    Employee Stock Ownership Plan 5.32 5.65 –0.33 (0.04)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.001)
    Employee Stock Purchase Plan 6.16 5.51 0.65 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)
  401(k)  plan 5.57 5.65 –0.08 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.005 (0.001)∗∗∗
      Exercising options and keeping 
 stock
6.11 5.59 0.52 (0.06)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)
  Open  market  purchase   6.49   5.55   0.94   (0.05)∗∗∗   0.003   (0.000)∗∗∗
Notes: Based on NBER data. s.e.  standard error.
aControlling for age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, 
number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), ln(wealth), and twenty-  one country 
dummies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.64        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
bers, however, are more risk averse than non-  ESOP members in a simple 
comparison, and risk loving is not a signiﬁ  cant predictor of ESOP member-
ship, or of owning stock through an ESPP or exercised stock options, after 
controlling for demographic, pay, and wealth variables.
Does risk aversion aﬀect employees’ views of variable pay? Most of the 
NBER workers would prefer to be paid in part with proﬁ  t sharing, company 
stock, or stock options, as shown in table 1.8. Remarkably, even two-  thirds 
(66 percent) of the most risk-  averse employees would prefer this, while 86 
percent of the least risk-  averse prefer this. Very similar results are obtained 
by a question asking about the employee’s next pay increase, where again 
two- thirds of the most risk- averse would prefer at least some of the increase 
to be in the form of shared capitalism pay. This would not make sense if 
the employees were seeing the shared capitalism pay as simply adding risk; 
rather, they are likely perceiving a chance for increased reward and perhaps 
some of the other beneﬁ  ts for workers analyzed in chapter 8.
About three-  fourths of employees would prefer a new bonus program to 
be based at least in part on their individual performance, where the line of 
sight is clearly greatest. Almost three- ﬁ  fths (58 percent), however, prefer that 
it also be based on company proﬁ  ts or performance, while only about one-
 third (37 percent) prefer that it be based in part on work group performance. 
It may be that the greater line of sight for work group bonuses is trumped by 
their greater perceived risk, as work group performance is probably seen as 
more variable than overall company performance (which averages across all 
work groups in the company). Those with low risk aversion are more likely 
to choose individual-   or work group-  based bonuses, while risk aversion is 
not related to the desire for company-  based bonuses.
Most employees would not vote to sell the company to an outside inves-
tor for a 50 percent premium, but would do so for a 100 percent premium. 
This likelihood is lowest among those with high risk aversion, reﬂ  ecting 
greater concern about job loss if the company were sold. While the concern 
about job loss is the most common reason for refusing to sell the company, 
about one- third of employees say they would refuse to sell because they like 
owning company stock (33 percent), and a similar number say they would 
refuse because they like the sense of community from employee ownership 
(37 percent). A lot more research is needed on this broader issue of employee 
ownership and workers’ corporate governance rights since governance has 
always been seen by corporate ﬁ  nance experts as being partly about manag-
ing risk. (It is standard in investment banking to provide more governance 
rights when risk is higher.)
Finally, most workers say that they would be willing to accept some degree 
of lower regular pay in exchange for the opportunity to participate in a 
company- based bonus system averaging 10 percent of their pay. This willing-
ness varies substantially, however: two-  ﬁ  fths (41 percent) would not accept 
lower pay, while one-  sixth (15 percent) would accept less than 5 percent Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy    6 5
lower pay, one-  fourth (27 percent) would accept 5 percent lower pay, and 
one-  sixth (17 percent) would accept more than 5 percent lower pay. This is 
predictably related to risk aversion: a majority of the most risk averse would 
not accept any lower regular pay (55 percent), compared to only a third of 
the least risk averse (33 percent).
Table 1.8  Worker views of performance-  based pay
Risk aversion
    Overall   High   Medium   Low
Type of pay preferred
  All  ﬁ  xed wage or salary 22% 34% 25% 14%∗∗∗
    Paid in part with proﬁ  t sharing, stock, or stock options 78% 66% 75% 86%∗∗∗
 n 13,199 2,090 5,069 5,953
Preference for next pay increase
  All  ﬁ  xed pay 27% 33% 28% 23%∗∗∗
    Split  between  ﬁ  xed wages and proﬁ  t sharing, stock, or 
 options
60% 55% 61% 62%∗∗∗
  All  proﬁ  t sharing, stock, and options 13% 12% 11% 15%∗∗∗
 n 25,869 5,318 9,805 10,330
Would prefer new bonus plan to be based on (can pick 
  more  than  one)
  Your  individual  performance 77% 71% 77% 79%∗∗∗
    Your work group performance 37% 31% 36% 40%∗∗∗
  Company  proﬁ  ts or performance 58% 57% 59% 59%
 n 13,379 2,144 5,133 6,002
Would vote to sell company if outside investor oﬀered:
  50%  premium 41% 36% 39% 45%∗∗∗
  100%  premium 64% 57% 61% 68%∗∗∗
    Reasons for not selling for 50% premium:
    Like  owning  company  stock 33% 35% 33% 32%
        Like sense of community from employee ownership 37% 37% 36% 39%
    Concerned  about  investor  laying  oﬀ employees 70% 75% 73% 65%∗∗∗
    O ﬀer might mean company is worth more 39% 33% 38% 44%∗∗∗
 n 12,938 2,059 4,931 5,854
Lower pay accepted for company-  based bonus averaging 
  10%
    Mean percent lower regular pay accepted  3.31 2.28 3.15 3.91∗∗∗
  (standard  deviation) (3.56) (3.21) (3.51) (3.63)
    0% lower pay accepted 41% 55% 43% 33%∗∗∗
    Between 0% and 5% lower pay accepted 15% 15% 15% 15%
    5% lower pay accepted 27% 19% 26% 31%∗∗∗
    More than 5% lower pay accepted 17% 11% 16% 21%∗∗∗
 n   29,426   5,535   11,141   12,480
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant diﬀerence among risk groups at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant diﬀerence at the 5 percent level.
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The NBER employees, of course, may not be representative of the overall 
workforce—in particular, they may have joined these companies because 
they are less risk averse and more favourably inclined toward shared capi-
talism than most workers. The data are broadly consistent, however, with 
existing representative surveys. Over half (57 percent) of workers in a 1986 
BNA/  Bruskin poll said they would trade their next pay increase for a share 
in the company, while 44 percent said this in a 1989 EBRI/ Gallup poll (sum-
marized in Kruse and Blasi [1999]). Workers in general report that, if they 
had company stock, they would be less likely than the NBER workers to 
vote to sell the company even for a substantial premium.14 This indicates 
either a more rosy view of the advantages of employee ownership among 
the workforce in general, or more concern about an outside investor laying 
oﬀ workers. The public surveys do show positive views of employee owner-
ship: strong majorities think employee- owners will work harder, have higher 
commitment, and be more concerned with the long-  term success of the 
company. Participation in decisions, however, appears to be very important: 
most employees would prefer participation in decisions to having a share 
of ownership, and say that if they owned stock, they would not let manage-
ment vote their shares on major corporate issues (summarized in Kruse and 
Blasi [1999]).
Overall, as expected, risk aversion is a key factor for shared capitalism: 
it appears most likely to steer workers away from positions providing gain 
sharing or individual bonuses, and to discourage workers from allocating 
401(k) assets toward company stock or purchasing company stock on the 
open market. Greater risk aversion is associated with less positive views of 
shared capitalism pay, but even among the most risk- averse employees, two-
  thirds says they prefer some shared capitalism as part of their pay package.
1.4    Conclusion
Contrary to concerns about the free rider problem and worker risk aver-
sion, a substantial number of workers participate in shared capitalism 
plans and are open to more shared capitalism in their ﬁ  rms. Nationally-
  representative surveys of private-  sector employees and ﬁ  rms show that:
•    One-  fourth to one-  third of employees are eligible for proﬁ  t sharing.
•    About one-  fourth of employees are eligible for gain sharing.
•   About  one- ﬁ  fth of employees own stock in their companies.
•   Between one- twelfth and one- eighth of employees are eligible for stock 
options or hold stock options.
14. The 41 percent who would sell for a 50 percent premium is somewhat higher than the 23 
percent ﬁ  gure for all employees from a 1989 EBRI/  Gallup poll, and the 64 percent who would 
vote to sell for a 100 percent premium is much higher than the 36 percent ﬁ  gure for all employees 
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•   Overall, between one-  third and one-  half of employees participate in 
some form of shared capitalism.
Why do ﬁ  rms use these plans, and why do workers accept them? This chap-
ter broadly reviews the major reasons for adopting these plans and some of 
the research results. The two major categories of reasons for adopting these 
plans are productivity-  related and ﬂ  exibility-  related reasons. Prior studies 
ﬁ  nd that these plans tend to be associated with better company performance 
on average, but there is wide dispersion in outcomes. The goal of the other 
chapters using these data is to explain this dispersion and understand why, 
where, and how shared capitalism does or does not work. Limited evidence 
also shows that these plans tend to be associated with greater job stability, 
ﬁ  rm survival, and employee compensation—the latter ﬁ  nding helping to 
explain why employees express positive attitudes toward shared capitalism 
plans. The dispersion of results indicates that there is still much to learn 
about how these plans can play a positive role in workplaces. Research has 
not nailed down the complementary role that other human resource policies 
play in aﬀecting worker attitudes and ﬁ  rm performance.
Both the NBER data set and the nationally-  representative GSS data set 
indicate that while shared capitalism exists broadly throughout the economy, 
it is not distributed randomly across ﬁ  rms and employees. One important 
ﬁ  nding is that shared capitalism plans are more likely in larger establish-
ments, where free riding is likely to be the highest. To counter free riding, 
ﬁ  rms may combine shared capitalism with other policies to create a coop-
erative culture. An initial exploration of work organization and policies 
supports this idea: shared capitalism employees are more likely to partici-
pate in workplace decision- making and training programs, and to have high 
job security and low levels of supervision. Within-  company comparisons 
show that they are also more likely to work in teams, and proﬁ  t/  gain shar-
ing employees can more easily observe co- worker performance, creating the 
conditions for cooperative teamwork. An examination of risk aversion in 
the NBER data set shows that, as expected, risk aversion is linked to lower 
participation in several types of plans and less positive views of shared capi-
talism, but even among the most risk averse employees, two- thirds prefer to 
have some form of shared capitalism in their pay package.
So risk aversion does not appear to be an insurmountable barrier and 
there appear to be conditions for productive cooperation—does this in fact 
occur? What other eﬀects does shared capitalism have on both ﬁ  rms and 
employees? These relationships are probed and tested in the following chap-
ters, using the GSS and NBER data to explore a wide variety of outcomes 
for both workers and ﬁ  rms.
Over the last few decades many economists have said about various shared 
capitalism practices: “If it makes so much sense then why do we not observe 
more ﬁ  rms and employees doing it?” The response put forward by these 68        Douglas L. Kruse, Joseph R. Blasi, and Rhokeun Park
prevalence ﬁ  gures is: “It appears to have spread throughout the economy, 
so what does that mean?” This chapter has examined some of the linkages 
between shared capitalism practices and other employment practices. These 
linkages raise another series of questions: are managers in companies mak-
ing the right choices about how to achieve optimal performance from shared 
capitalist practices, or are there patterns and combinations that work better 
and worse? In other words, is what we observe optimal because that is the 
shared capitalist arrangement that has emerged in the laboratory of real 
life? Or, should managers consider making substantive changes to how they 
organize shared capitalism because it can be done well or poorly? One needs 
to beware of looking at these incidence patterns with a “deterministic” frame 
of mind. It should not be immediately concluded that just because there are 
certain types of shared capitalist practices (such as company stock in 401(k) 
plans as a lone form of shared capitalism) or combinations of these practices 
with human resource policies (such as a low incidence of self-management 
work teams with employee ownership) that somehow managers have told 
us these are the best workable combinations. Firms and managers may have 
it wrong in some cases and right in others. (For an example of a manager’s 
analysis, see Carey [2004].) These data will be used to explore the answers 
to these questions.
This NBER research program continues a long tradition of examination 
of shared capitalism by economists. The phenomenon was seen as being 
so important that John Bates Clark, a founder of the American Economic 
Association, wrote a book in the 1880s calling for the combination of proﬁ  t-
  sharing and employee ownership in companies to improve business perfor-
mance by motivating worker involvement (Clark 1886). With his encour-
agement and with the hard work of a research group organized at Johns 
Hopkins University to survey the nation on this question, the ﬁ  rst volume 
of the journal of the American Economics Association included an article 
surveying shared capitalism in companies in the Northeast (Bemis 1886) 
and in the Midwestern city of Minneapolis (Shaw 1886; Adams 1888). Sub-
sequent early issues covered other regions of the United States. Given that 
almost half of US employees currently report participating in some form 
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